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FREGE‘S DEFINITION O F  NUMBERS 
Edwin Martin 
Indiana University 
In searching for a theory of number, one of the first and most 
fundamental decisions (or discoveries) to be made for Frege 
concerns the logical status of numbers: are they objects or 
functions? The route to the answer to this question in the 
Grundlagen‘ is tortuous indeed. It does not immediately 
emerge that numbers are objects, and given a knowledge of 
Frege’s later work, one might not think that this view was 
forthcoming at all. In what follows I want to considerjust what 
objects Frege thinks numbers are, and how and why his early 
account of this in the Grundlagen differs from his later 
Grundgesetze formulation. 
We cannot see numbers as applicable to physical objects, 
Frege thought, for it is not clear which numbers will apply: 
I am able to think of the Iliad either as one poem or as 24 
Books, or as some large number of verses . . . One pair of 
boots may be the same visible and tangible phenomenon as 
two boots. (FA, 28, 33) 
Applications of numbers, rather, must be relative to some 
standard of counting, some criterion for dividing things up: 
The concept ‘letters in the word three’ isolates the t from the 
h, the h from the r ,  and so on. The concept ‘syllables in the 
word three’ picks out the word as a whole, and as indivisible 
in the sense that no part of it falls any longer under the same 
concept . . . Only a concept which isolates what falls under it 
in a definite manner, and which does not permit any 
arbitrary division of it into parts, can be a unit relative to a 
finite number. (FA, 66) 
Numbers, then, must primarily apply to a concept, one ‘which 
59 
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isolates what falls under it in a definite manner.’ Frege later 
became willing to assign numbers to courses-of-values, a kind 
of object; but this was not a change of view, for with the course- 
of-values comes a concept which uniquely determines how the 
relevant objects are to be divided. There is no chance of 
ambiguity. 
Attributions of number, then, are statements about 
concepts: 
If I say ‘Venus has 0 moons’, there simply does not exist any 
moon or agglomeration of moons for anything to be 
asserted of; but what happens is that a property is assigned 
to the concept ‘moon of Venus’ namely that of including 
nothing under it. (FA, 59) 
Now we know that Frege thought of properties of first-level 
concepts as second-level concepts; and the property of a 
concept of including nothing under it he expressed in terms of 
quanriflers - often cited as examples of second-level concept 
names. A name of the property of a concept of including 
nothing under it, in a modern notation equivalent to Frege’s, is 
From here it is a small step to thinking of the second-level 
concept, this property of concepts, as the number 0. ‘Venus has 
0 moons’ then comes to be construed as: the concept ‘moon of 
Venus’ has the property 0 - the property of including nothing 
under it. 
Apparent confirmation of this construal of Frege’s words is 
later to be found. He says, 
. . . the proposition that there exists no rectangular 
equilateral rectilinear triangle does state a property of the 
concept ‘rectangular equilateral rectilinear triangle’; it 
assigns to it the number nought. In this respect existence is 
analogous to number. Affirmation of existence is in fact 
nothing but denial of the number nought. (FA, 640 
And three pages later we find Frege saying ‘that we have 
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learned [that] the content of a statement of number is an 
assertion about a concept.’ 
Other non-negative integers, on this construal, would be 
other second-level concepts. The number 1, for instance, 
would be the property of a concept of including exactly one 
thing under it. A name of this property is readily available for 
Frege: and we might put it as 
Generally, the number n would be the property of a concept of 
including exactly n things under it. All such properties would 
find familiar names in Frege’s symbolism. 
Even though Frege’s words suggest that numbers are these 
second-level concepts, we later find that ‘we have already 
settled that number words are to be understood as standing for 
self-subsistent objects’ (FA, 73). Somewhere, then, in the 
intervening pages lies the reasoning to this conclusion. Part of 
that reasoning seems to involve the ease with which adjectival 
uses of number words can be supplanted by nominal uses. It 
was precisely the adjectival uses which led us to view numbers 
as the references of quantifiers. But, Frege thinks, such uses 
can always be eliminated in favor of nominal uses; thus 
‘Jupiter has four moons’ goes over into ‘The number of 
Jupiter’s moons is four’ (cf. FA, 69,116). So what is important 
is the use of a number word as a noun; it is this Frege attends to 
in seeking the logical status of numbers. 
The rest of Frege’s evidence is grammatical. We find him 
repeatedly emphasizing two sides to a criterion for 
distinguishing names of objects from concept words. Object 
names, he insists, are not pluralizable, though concept words 
are (FA, 49,50,59,63,64,80); and concept words take only the 
indefinite article, while names of objects never do -they take 
only the definite article (cf. FA, 49,63,64,68,77, 80). Given 
this, it is easy to see why Frege glosses numerals as names of 
objects, and thus thinks numbers to be objects (that is, the 
references of object names). For, ‘the word ‘one’, as the proper 
name of an object of mathematical study, does not admit of a 
plural,’ (FA, 58) and ‘we speak of ‘the number l’, where the 
definite article serves to class it as an object’(FA, 68); or, again, 
62 EDWIN MARTIN 
When we speak of ‘the number one’, we indicate by means of 
the definite article a definite and unique object of scientific 
study. There are not diverse numbers one, but only one. In 1 
we have a proper name, which as such does not admit of a 
plural any more than ‘Frederick the Great’ or ‘the chemical 
element gold’. (FA,  49) 
As Dummett notes2 (Frege, 58ff), these criteria are superficial, 
and adequate conditions for characterizing proper names 
would no doubt appeal to patterns of valid inference. But what 
is primary here is not the degree and kind of ‘saturation’ that I 
might have, but, rather, the role it plays in the hierarchy of 
reference; that is, we look to the syntactic category of its 
name3. Frege’s tests are supposed to be helpful in determining 
the syntactic categories of expressions, and thus determining 
where their references fit into the hierarchy of reference. We 
look to the language, then, to find ‘a concept of number usable 
for the purposes of science’; if we can get the logical grammar 
of the language straight, then we will be well on our way to 
seeing what objects and what concepts there are. So Frege 
determines whether or not something is an object by 
determining if its names are proper names, and this takes the 
form of grammatical tests. 
How can we reconcile this ultimate conclusion with the 
other passages? We find, Frege thinks, when we ‘get a clearer 
view of what we mean by our expression ‘the content of a 
statement of number is an assertion about a concept’ ’ that 
in the sentence ‘the number 0 belongs to the concept F‘, 0 is 
only an element in the predicate . . . For this reason I have 
avoided calling a number such as 0 or 1 or 2 a property of a 
concept. Precisely because it forms only an element in what 
is asserted, the individual number show itself for what it is, a 
self-subsistent object. (FA, 68) . 
Frege here seems to say that ‘The number 0 belongs to the 
concept F‘ should not be pictured as in ( I ) ,  but rather as 
something like ‘N(F,O)’; accordingly, a name of the property of 
a concept of including nothing under it would be, not (I) ,  but 
‘N(f,O)’, or better, 
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Numerals, then, form only part of concept words. And since 
they take definite, not indefinite, articles, and are not 
pluralizable, they should be seen as proper names in order to 
serve the ‘purposes of science.’ 
Now Frege believed that all the truths about numbers - 
arithmetical truths - 
are analytic judgments and consequently a priori. 
Arithmetic thus becomes simply a development of logic, 
and every arithmetical truth a law of logic, albeit a 
derivative one. (FA, 99) 
Every arithmetical truth, then, is ‘deducible solely from purely 
logical laws.’ This thesis by itself does not commit Frege to 
holding that arithmetic appeals to no irreducibly arithmetical 
notions, but only that such notions appear vacuously in 
arithemitical truths and could be systematically supplanted by 
other notions without affecting deducibility. Frege, however, 
did hold that arithmetic deals with no irreducibly arithmetical 
notions; the primitive vocabulary of arithmetic, he thought, is 
logical in nature and can be defined satisfactorily in logical 
terms. He thus he.ld that a two-pronged reduction of arithmetic 
to logic could be made: (a) all arithmetical vocabulary can be 
defined‘ in purely logical terms, and (b) all arithmetical truths 
can be proven by purely logical means from a base containing 
only laws of logic. We know today, thanks to Godel, that given 
natural constraints, (b) is false. 
As we have seen, Frege took it that concepts were primarily 
what attributions of number were about and ‘that the number 
studied by arithmetic must be conceived not as a dependent 
attribute, but substantivally’. (FA, 116) This suggests that a 
way into the reduction is to define ‘the number of Fs’ for 
arbitrary concept F; we might represent this as: NxFx. To 
accomplish this Frege first said what it is for the objects falling 
under F and under G to be correlated one-one with each other 
by the relation R. Frege thought of this relation as holding 
between the courses-of-values of F and of G. The course-of- 
values of a concept F (which I will symbolize as ‘e’Fe’) can, in 
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this context, be thought of without much loss as the set of 
objects falling under F. Though this is not quite right, it is a 
helpful approximation. We can then abbreviate the relation as 
1 - 1  R (e’Fe, e’Ge) 
The definition Frege gave of this is now standard. It involves 
four things: (i)  R maps Fs only to Gs, (ii) R maps an F to  
each G ,  (iii) R is a function, and (iv) R is one-one (see FA, 
83ff). Next Frege said what it is for the concept F to  be 
equinumerous with the concept G; obviously this holds just if 
there are just as many Fs as Gs,  and this holds just if the objects 
falling under F and those falling under G can be correlated 
one-one with each other. Thus the stipulation is that 
(ER)l-1 R (e’Fe, e’Ge) 
This Frege seems to  regard as a second-level relation holding 
between the concepts F and G. Thus we might abbreviate it as 
EQx(Fx,Gx). 
This now gives us a way to explain the senses of some 
sentences containing expressions of the form ‘the number of 
Fs’. In particular, we can explain a sentence such as ‘The 
number of Fs = the number of Gs’ as meaning, simply, that 
EQx(Fx,Gx). But, still, we are not yet in a position to explain 
the senses of all sentences containing expressions of the form 
‘the number of Fs’; we have no sense, for example, for ‘The 
number of Fs = Julius Caesar’ (see FA, 1 17). Nor does it seem 
that we could declare all such sentences false with-out running 
the risk of glossing a truth like ‘The number of Fs = 2’ as false. 
The situation here is quite analogous to that of course-of- 
values.4 An identity involving two numerical abstracts, 
NxFx = NxGx, 
is explained by Frege in terms of a higher-order concept as, 
EQx( Fx,Gx). 
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Similarly, an identity involving two courses-of-values 
abstracts, 
e’Fe = e’Ge 
is explained by Frege (by invoking Basic Law V)  in terms of a 
higher-order concept as 
(x)( Fx - Gx). 
Such an explanation is not sufficient in the case of course-of- 
values abstracts to provide for elimination of them from all 
sentential contexts. First, there are identities involving only 
one abstract. as in 
e’Fe = (x)x=x. 
Frege deals with these sentences by identifying truth values 
with certain courses-of-values, thus reducing this case to the 
first kind. The analogous problem for numerical abstracts is 
with identities containing only one abstract, as in 
NxFx = a. 
And ‘a’ might here be a name of Julius Caesar. 
It turns out with course-of-values abstracts that even the 
added identification of truth values with course-of-values is 
insufficient for complete elimination. For example, we are still 
helpless with respect to 
(x) ey(e=e) = x. 
Elsewhere I call this a case (I)  problern.5 Formally identical 
problems occur for numerical abstracts. Consider the concept 
‘is the number of the concept F,’ viz., 
NxFx = y. 
Consider now the number of this concept, viz., 
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Ny(NxFx = y). 
And now consider the identity 
Ny(NxFx=y) = NyGy. 
Our reductive equivalence tells us that this last identity means 
the same thing as 
and expanding this to primitive terms yields a statement of the 
form 
(ER)((y)(NxFx=y - (Ez) . . . .) 
And this is precisely a case (I) problem for numerical abstracts, 
for we have an abstract on one side of the identity sign and a 
variable bound by a quantifier on the other side. Of course 
other problem cases with course-of-values abstracts will be 
mirrored here as well. So all of the problems with elimination 
of course-of-values abstracts will also be problems for 
eliminating numerical abstracts. And since it is quite 
implausible that all objects will be the number of some 
concept, chances for solution here are even dimmer than they 
are with course-of-values. 
The way out of these difficulties, Frege thought, is to present 
an explicit definition of ‘the number of Fs’ which would render 
it eliminable from any context. Thus he went on to say what it 
is to be the number which belongs to the concept F - NxFx; it 
is ‘the extension of the concept ‘equinumerous with the 
concept F ’ (FA, 85), that is 
The concept ‘equinumerous with the concept F‘ is second- 
level, applying as it does to first-level concepts; thus its course- 
of-values is no ordinary one. Frege later talked of courses-of- 
values only for first-level functions and explicitly thought of 
them this way in the Grundgesetze (see Basic Laws, 87). The 
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above definition extricates Frege from his previous difficulties 
because now every sentence in which ‘the number of Fs’ occurs 
can be transformed into a sentence whose sense is known; 
though we may still not know the truth value of ‘The number of 
Fs = Julius Caesar’, its sense is determined - it is that of 
‘g’(EQx(Fx,gx)) = Julius Caesar’. 
Frege can now go on to say that an object is a numberjust in 
case it is the number of some concept (FA, 85) ,  i.e., 
N(a)- (Ef)a = Nxfx 
0 will be the number of the concept ‘not identical with itself, 
i.e., 
0 = Nx(xfx) 
Further definitions of the other natural numbers, of 
succeeding n in the series of natural numbers, addition, 
multiplication, and so on are now possible. These were to 
provide a suitable basis for proving Peano’s postulates and 
thus, Frege thought, all arithmetical truths. 
Frege’s later presentation of his derivation of arithmetic 
from logic was a little different and, in terms of his mature 
doctrines about functions, tidier. The number function is the 
Grundgesetze, unlike Nxfx, is a first-level function which is 
applicable to objects generally. The number of the course-of- 
values of F now is a certain ordinary course-of-values. If we 
were to put the differences between the Grundlagen and 
Grundgesetze accounts in terms of sets, it might be: 
the number of the concept F in the Grundlagen is the set of 
all equinumerous concepts, 
while 
the number of the set of Fs in the Grundgesetze is the set of 
all equinumerous sets. 
More accurately, the difference is: 
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the number of the concept Fin the Grundlugen is the course- 
of-values of the concept: i s  a concept equinumerous with F, 
while 
the number of the course-of-values of the concept F in the 
Grundgesetze is the course-of-values of the concept: is a 
course-of-values equinumerous with the course-of-values of 
the concept F. 
In the Grundgesetze, accordingly, appeal need only be made to 
courses-of-values of first-level functions; and, unlike the 
Grundlugen account, we need only a second-level course-of- 
values function which takes first-level functions to objects. 0, 
on the latter account, is simply e’(e # e) (the course-of-values 
corresponding to the empty set). 
The differences in the two series of definitions does not 
represent a major change in Frege’s beliefs about numbers. 
Rather, it is just a reflection of the maturing of his views of 
functions during the nine year period. In the Grundlagen Frege 
did not have a full view of the relations between functions and 
objects and was thus liable to obscure distinctions and 
differences he would be at  pains to emphasize in the 
Grundgesetze. Yet the Grundgesetze presents the ideas of the 
Grundiugen slightly reformed but essentially unchanged. On 
both accounts, of course, numbers are objects. 
We have seen that Frege thought numbers to be objects 
because he thought numerals satisfy certain grammatical tests 
for being proper names. These tests Dummett characterizes as 
‘superficial’ and notes that Frege 
thus did not adequately protect himself from the gibe that he 
would be forced to admit such objects as the whereabouts of 
the prime minister or the manner in which General 
Eisenhower putts.6 
Frege’s concern with identity conditions might, as Dummett 
notes, be taken to provide the needed protection: not only 
must an expression be non-pluralizable and take the definite 
article if it is to name an object, but it must have a definite 
sense: 
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If we are to use the symbol a to signify an object, we must 
have a criterion for deciding in all cases whether b is the 
same as a, even if it is not always in our power to apply this 
criterion . . . When we have thus acquired a means of 
arriving at a determinate number and of recognizing it again 
as the same, we can assign it a number word as its proper 
name. (FA, 73) 
This, Frege maintained, is not to say that the relationship of 
identity is peculiar to numbers, or that a special kind of 
identity is especially applicable. Rather, there is one 
unequivocal relation which holds among all kinds of objects. 
He says, 
We should expect the concept of identity to have been fixed 
first, and that then, from it together with the concept of 
Number, it must be possible to deduce when Numbers are 
identical with one another, without there being need for this 
purpose of a special definition of numerical identity as well. 
(FA, 74) 
We can fix the general relationship of identity A la Leibniz, as 
Frege does (FA, 76). Given Frege’s acceptance of concepts, 
what is suggested is that a = b if and only if all concepts under 
which a falls are concepts under which b falls, and vice versa. 
Indeed, in the Grundgesetze, the truth of this is explicitly 
asserted (see Basic Laws, $20, pp. 11 1, 115) and appears to be 
taken as a reformulation of the GrundZugen version. But then it 
is hard to see why this does not provide ‘a criterion for deciding 
. . . whether b is the same as a, even if it is not always in our 
power to apply’ it. That is, why does not the relation of identity 
by itself fix the sense of any proper name by providing a 
criterion of identity? 
If Frege were asked to decide whether the number of planets 
is Julius Caesar he would no doubt reply that this is just the 
question of whether Julius Caesar is the extension of the 
concept: is a concept equinumerous with the concept planet. 
But, now, how is this question to be decided; what is the 
relevant criterion of identity? It is just that whatever concept 
Caesar falls under our extension does also, and conversely? If 
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so, it is hard to see that much has been gained. As Dummett 
says in another connection, 
It is not at all clear that [Frege gets] out of the difficulty he 
believed himself to be in, for in order to use the technique to 
demonstrate that Julius Caesar is not the number of planets, 
we have to know that Julius Caesar is not a class of 
concepts, and the question arises how we know this. (‘Frege, 
Gottlob,’ 235) 
If the criterion is to be one which ‘it is not always in our power 
to apply’, then the general criterion of identity seems 
indispensible and as good as any other. If, though, the criterion 
is to improve on our abilities of discrimination, then it is not at 
all clear that Frege succeeds. It seems just false that ‘our 
definition affords us a means of recognizing this object as the 
same again’ in any way not afforded us by the Leibnizian 
criterion. 
Perhaps Frege only means to suggest that all identity 
sentences must be provided with a clear sense. The only way to 
do this which will not be circular, will not somewhere appeal to 
some unexplained proper name, is to start from a base 
composed wholly of function names. In the Grundgesetze this 
is done. The Grundlagen account fits well with this approach: 
it provides senses for all sentences containing an expression of 
the form ‘the number of Fs’ in logical terms - provided the 
other expressions in the sentence are antecedently understood. 
Of course, these problems, seemingly, would have to be faced 
all over again with function names. 
In the Grundgesetze (0 10) Frege faced similar difficulties 
with courses-of-values, and, as we have seen, he handled them 
quite differently. The initial problem, analogous to defining 
‘the number of Fs’ (“xFx’), is to define ‘the course-of-values 
of F‘ (‘e’Fe’). Here the first step is to say when courses-of- 
values are the same: viz., 
e’Fe = e’Ge-(x)(Fx-Gx). 
The analogous first step with numbers is to say when numbers 
are the same: viz., 
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NxFx = NxGx-EQx(Fx,Gx). 
It is at this point that Frege began to worry about Julius Caesar 
and sought an explicit definition of ‘the number of Fs’. In the 
Grundgesetze though, Frege goes to other way with courses- 
of-values: instead of seeking an explicit definition of ‘the 
course-of-values of F‘ he tries to give rules for deciding the 
senses of all sentences in which course-of-values notation 
appears. He gives, that is, a series of contextual definitions 
aimed at allowing elimination of course-of-values abstracts 
from any context. In the formal language of the Grundgesetze 
truth values are the only available objects besides courses-of- 
values, and so the whole problem seems to boil down to 
deciding the sense of an identity sentence involving a name of a 
course-of-values and a name of a truth value: e.g., ‘e’Fe = 
(Ex)Fx’. In order to attach a definite sense to sentences like this 
Frege identifies truth values with certain courses-of-values; he 
is thus able to see the sense of such identity sentences as the 
same as certain sentences stating identities between courses-of- 
values, and the senses of these have already been explained. 
(This will, as noted before, leave us powerless to decide the 
senses of some sentences.) The analogous move when Frege 
comes to numbers would be to identify courses-of-values (and 
thus truth values as well) with certain numbers; in a way, Frege 
does the reverse: he identifies numbers with certain courses-of- 
values. But now all the problems with Julius Caesar and 
criteria of identity for numbers should disappear because every 
identity of the arithmetic language will have a definite sense. 
Had Frege’s treatment of numbers paralleled his treatment of 
courses-of-values, no explicit definitions would have been 
given. Frege might have readily adopted such a parallel course 
with numbers had it occurred to him, for he thought that his 
Grundlagen solution 
cannot be expected to meet with universal approval, and 
many will prefer other methods of removing the doubt in 
question. I attach no decisive importance even to bringing in 
the extensions of concepts at  all. (FA, 117) 
The success of Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic 
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depends on there being enough relations of the right kind to 
correlate the Fs one-one with the Gs whenever, intuitively, 
there are as many Fs as Gs. It also depends on there being 
enough variety in relations to guarantee the infinity of the 
number sequence, to guarantee that every number has an 
immediate successor in the series. The relevant notions Frege 
was able to express with the aid of his celebrated definition of 
the ancestral. First he defines ‘n follows in the series of natural 
numbers directly after m’, S(m,N), as 
(Ef)(Ey)(fy & Nxfx=n) & Nx(fx & xfy) = m). 
(See FA, 89). Then Frege says what it is for n to follow m 
(directly or indirectly) in the number series, S*(m,n): 
(See FA, 92). Now for each number n Frege needs a concept 
under which exactly n+ 1 objects fall; and for this the concept 
of being a natural number less than or equal to n will serve: 
S*(a,n) or a = n. 
This name will be a correctly-formed concept-word of the 
begriffsschrift and therefore according to Frege it will stand 
for a concept. Thus included in Frege’s ‘logic’ is the existential 
assumption that there are infinitely many concepts. Also 
included is the existential assumption that for each concept, F, 
there is a certain object which is the extension of the concept: is 
a concept equinumerous with F. These two assumptions - 
and other minor ones governing courses-of-values - are 
enough to guarantee the infinity of the number sequence. 
The underlying ‘logic’ Frege appeals to, then, is not just 
elementary logic, i.e., quantification theory and theory of 
identity. It includes, rather, presumptions of the existence of 
certain concepts and extensions. It is comparable, therefore, to 
set theory or second-order logic; it is set theory in sheep’s 
clothing, but set theory nonetheless. Consequently it seems 
plausible that Frege’s construal of logic is somewhat wider 
than that of his predecessors, and that, as Quine says, 
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Kant’s readiness to see logic as analytic and arithmetic as 
synthetic . . . is not superseded by Frege’s work (as Frege 
supposed) if ‘logic’ be taken as elementary logic. And for 
Kant logic certainly did not include set theory.’ 
Kant, that is, very well might not have seen Frege’s reductions 
of arithmetical truths as flowing solely by logic from purely 
logical laws: he could well have seen Frege existential 
assumptions, though true, as surpassing the laws of logic. 
The inconsistency Russell found in the Grundgesetze, of 
course, is a result of Frege’s assumptions about the existence of 
concepts and extensions. Elimination of the assumptions, or 
Frege’s alteration of them, has a disasterous effect on Frege’s 
reduction: as Frege was quick to notice, all but a handful of his 
proofs depend upon them and thus will be invalidated. This is 
an undeniably fatal blow to Frege’s claim to have shown 
arithmetic analytic. Still, Frege’s work paved the way for 
construction of set theories which are not known to be 
inconsistent and within which Peano’s postulates and 
consequent arithmetical truths can be derived. 
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